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Consistent With Inconsistency:
The Sixth Circuit Keeps Manifest
Disregard After Hall Street
Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C.1
I. INTRODUCTION
For over half a century, courts have used the doctrine of manifest disregard as
a ground for vacating arbitration awards.2 However, the Supreme Court's ruling
in Hall Street Associates. v. Mattel raised questions among lower courts regarding
the viability of the doctrine after the Hall Street decision. Today, many lower
courts differ in their application of the doctrine. Some courts claim that the Hall
Street decision has ended the viability of manifest disregard.4 Others claim that
the doctrine lives on as an interpretation of section 10 of the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA),5 despite the Supreme Court's ruling in Hall Street.
6
Recently, in Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C., the U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit sided with those courts that claim the manifest disre-
gard doctrine survives after Hall Street.7 The decision in Coffee Beanery did not
hold that manifest disregard is an interpretation of the FAA, as did many lower
courts after Hall Street.8 Like some other courts, though, the decision in Coffee
Beanery maintains the doctrine of manifest disregard in a way that seems to con-
tradict some important aspects of the Hall Street decision.
11. FACTS AND HOLDING
In early 2003, Richard Welshans and Deborah Williams, owners of WW,
L.L.C. (WW), began to research the possibility of opening a coffee shop in Anna-
1. 300 F. App'x 415, 419 (6th Cir. 2008).
2. The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides four explicit grounds for vacatur of arbitration
awards. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006). "Manifest disregard" of the law is not among these grounds. Id. As
will be explained later in much more detail, manifest disregard is considered to be either a judicially-
created doctrine or an interpretation of the FAA that allows a reviewing court to overturn arbitration
rulings.
3. See Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, 128 S. Ct. 1396.
4. See Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 350 (5th Cir. 2009); Prime Therapeu-
tics, L.L.C. v. Omnicare, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 2d 993, 999 (D. Minn. 2008); Ramos-Santiago v. United
Parcel Service, 524 F.3d 120, 124 n.3 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting in dicta that manifest disregard is not a
proper grounds for vacatur under the FAA).
5. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006).
6. Stolt-Nielson SA v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 94 (2d Cir. 2008); Comedy Club, Inc.
v. hmprov West Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th Cir. 2008); Joseph Stevens & Co. v. Cikanek, 2008
WL 2705445, *4 (N.D. II1. 2008) (citing Wise v. Wachovia Sec., L.L.C., 450 F.3d 265, 268-69 (7th
Cir. 2006)).
7. Coffee Beanery, Ltd., v. WW, L.L.C., 300 F. App'x 415, 418-19 (6th Cir. 2008).
8. Id. at 419-20.
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polis, Maryland. 9 WW's research brought to bear the possibility of purchasing a
franchise from The Coffee Beanery, Ltd. (Coffee Beanery).' 0 WW contacted
Kevin Shaw (Shaw), Coffee Beanery's vice president of real estate, in June 2003
regarding a Coffee Beanery franchise.1' Later that year, WW visited Coffee Bea-
nery's headquarters in Flushing, Michigan, to gather more information about pos-
sibly purchasing a franchise.12 The parties later disagreed over the nature of that
visit. 13 WW claimed that they were persuaded to purchase a Caf6 Store as op-
posed to a traditional Coffee Beanery store. 14 WW asserted that Shaw suggested
Caf6 Stores were more lucrative and also that he made false representations con-
cerning the amount of money WW could expect to make.' 5  Coffee Beanery
claimed it provided proper disclosure and made no false representations.' 6 During
the visit, though, WW agreed to purchase a Caf6 Store and signed a franchise
agreement that allowed them to purchase and operate the store in Annapolis.' 7
WW encountered problems with their store as soon as it opened for business
in 2003, and by 2005, WW had suffered significant losses.' 8 WW filed suit on
December 15, 2005, in the U.S District Court for the District of Maryland, claim-
ing Coffee Beanery violated the Maryland Franchise Registration and Disclosure
Law (Franchise Act); WW also asserted claims for detrimental reliance, intention-
al misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation 9
On January 19, 2006, the Securities Commissioner of Maryland, in a civil
proceeding completely independent of WW's action, issued an order to show
cause against Coffee Beanery and Shaw.20 The Commissioner's order alleged that
Coffee Beanery and Shaw had violated various disclosure and fraud provisions of
the Franchise Act.21 On September 12, 2006, the Commissioner and Coffee Bea-
nery reached a consent order requiring: "(1) that the Coffee Beanery and Shaw
cease selling franchises in violation of Maryland Franchise Law; and (2) that WW
9. Id. at 416. WW is a Maryland Corporation, with its principal place of business located in Anna-
polis, Maryland. id.
10. Id. Coffee Beanery is a Michigan corporation with its principal place of business located in
Flushing, Michigan. Its main business involves selling and operating Coffee Beanery franchises in the
U.S. Id.
II. Id.




15. Id. WW claimed that Shaw led it to believe that Caf6 stores were more lucrative than standard
stores because they were not "seasonal." The Caf6 store also required an up-front franchise fee of




19. Id. at 417. Before filing the claim in federal court, WW originally submitted a demand for medi-
ation and arbitration to the American Arbitration Association. However, WW soon dropped the de-
mand claiming that this dispute did not fall within the scope of the parties' arbitration agreement. Id.
20. Id.
21. See MD. CODE ANN., Bus. REG. § 14-210 (West 2009); Coffee Beanery, 300 F. App'x at 417.
The Commissioner's allegations were nearly identical to WW's. The Commissioner claimed that "the
Coffee Beanery made material misrepresentations in connection with the offer and sale of Caf6 Store
franchises, that Shaw inappropriately told prospective buyers that they could expect a specific income
level form the operation of a Caf6 Store, and that the Coffee Beanery failed to provide prospective
franchisee a copy of the offering prospectus and a proposed franchise agreement." Id.
[Vol. 2009
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be entitled to a rescission offer that would be kept open for thirty days from the
date of notice."22 Coffee Beanery retained the right to deny any facts or conclu-
sions of the consent order in any proceeding in which the Commissioner was not a
party.23
Meanwhile, Coffee Beanery filed a petition to compel arbitration in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan on January 30, 2006.24 Coffee
Beanery claimed that under the franchise agreement, any dispute between WW
and Coffee Beanery must be resolved by arbitration.25 The court granted the peti-
26 2tion. WW submitted the dispute to arbitration in Michigan in January 2007.27
The arbitrator, JoAnne Barron, found in favor of Coffee Beanery on all claims
after an eleven-day hearing.
28
WW filed a motion to vacate the award on April 18, 2007, in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Michigan. 29 The court confirmed the award, finding that, among other
things, the arbitrator's decision did not manifestly disregard any laws or facts.
30
On appeal, WW claimed that the arbitrator ignored undisputed evidence that
Shaw had misled it regarding promotions, contracts, and potential earnings, and
that he had failed to disclose his prior felony conviction for grand larceny. 31 WW
argued that the arbitrator's decision to ignore this evidence, especially the convic-
tion for grand larceny, was in manifest disregard of Maryland franchise law.
32
Coffee Beanery acknowledged that it had not disclosed Shaw's conviction, but it
argued that disclosure of this type of conviction was not covered by the Franchise
Act.
3 3
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that federal courts may
still vacate arbitration awards for manifest disregard of the law and vacated the
award due to the arbitrator's manifest disregard of the Franchise Act.
34
HI. LEGAL HISTORY
A. Arbitration and the FAA
Arbitration is a process by which parties agree to settle their disputes through
the use of a detached and disinterested neutral. 35 The parties may agree by con-




26. id. On March 23, 2006, the Maryland district court issued an order staying the case in deference
to the state administrative proceedings and the Eastern District of Michigan, and administratively
closed the case. Id. at 417, n. 1.
27. Id. WW did not accept the rescission offer mandated by the consent order. Id.
28. Id. Among other things, the arbitrator found that Coffee Beanery was not required to disclose
Shaw's felony conviction for grand larceny under the Franchise Act. Id. at 419.
29. Id. at 417-18.
30. Id. The court also found that WW failed to establish "evident partiality," that the parties were not
required to mediate their claims, and that WW failed to establish fraud or perjury. WW filed for recon-
sideration of the opinion and order, but the request was denied. Id.
31. Id. at 419.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 420.
34. Id. at 421.
No. 2]
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tract to allow the arbitrator to listen to and rule on their claims under any rules and
procedures they have negotiated.36 The result is a process which, to many,
presents a speedy, efficient, and cost-effective alternative to traditional litigation.
37
In 1925, Congress passed the FAA as a response to the judicial system's refusal to
enforce private arbitration agreements.38 Congress passed the FAA in order to
replace this judicial indisposition with a national policy favoring agreements to
arbitrate and placing them "on equal footing with all other contracts."39 The FAA
makes any contract agreement to arbitrate "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable" as
long as the transaction involves commerce.40  The agreement is enforceable in
41both state and federal courts. Section 9 of the act provides that a court must
confirm an arbitration award unless it is vacated under section 10.42 Section 10
provides a court with four different circumstances in which it may vacate an
award. 43 Some courts use section 10's fourth ground for vacatur--the arbitrator
exceeding her powers-to justify manifest disregard as an interpretation of the
FAA.44
B. The Wilko Decision
In 1953, the Supreme Court decided a case that, until recently, many courts
interpreted as crafting grounds for vacating an arbitration award in addition to
section 10 of the FAA.45 In Wilko v. Swan,n6 the Supreme Court decided whether
the Securities Act of 1933 superseded arbitration agreements purporting to cover
claims under that act.47 In dictum, the Court said, "[T]he interpretations of the law
by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal
courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation." 48 The Court went on to say




38. Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1408 (Stevens & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting) (2008).
39. Id. at 1402 (majority opinion).
40. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
41. Hall St. Assocs., 128 S. Ct. at 1402.
42. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2006).
43. Id. § 10. These circumstances are:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where there was
evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the arbitrators were
guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in re-
fusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their
powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject
matter submitted was not made.
Id.
44. Hall Street Assocs., 128 S. Ct. at 1404 (Stevens & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
45. Id. at 1403 ("Hall Street reads this statement as recognizing 'manifest disregard of the law' as a
further ground for vacatur on top of those listed in §10 and some Circuits have read it the same way.").
46. 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
47. Id. at 430-38.
48. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-37.
[Vol. 2009
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that the FAA "contains no provision for judicial determination of legal issues such
as is found in the English law.
' 49
After Wilko, nearly every U.S. federal circuit adopted some form of "manifest
disregard of the law" as a basis for vacating an arbitration award in addition to the
provisions of section 10 of the FAA.50 This doctrine is construed narrowly and
awards are vacated pursuant to it only in rare circumstances. 5 ' The wording of the
doctrine is subject to variation in each jurisdiction, but courts generally apply the
following two-part test: "(1) Did the arbitrator know of the governing legal prin-
ciple yet refused to apply it or ignored it all together? and (2) Was the law ignored
by the arbitrators well defined, explicit and clearly applicable to the case?
52
Stated another way, a party must establish that the arbitrator recognized that a
controlling legal principle existed but intentionally decided not to apply it.
53
C. The Hall Street Decision
After Wilko, courts honed the manifest disregard doctrine and applied it as a
judicially created ground for vacating arbitration awards over the next half-
century. In 2008, the Supreme Court's opinion in Hall Street Associates v. Mattel
led many courts to question whether the manifest disregard doctrine still existed. 4
In Hall Street, the parties disputed a lease in which Hall Street, the landlord,
claimed that the tenant, Mattel, was obligated to indemnify Hall Street for the
costs of an environmental cleanup. 55 The parties drew up an arbitration agree-
ment, which the district court approved, stating that the district court could "va-
cate, modify or correct any award: (i) where the arbitrator's findings of facts are
not supported by substantial evidence, or (ii) where the arbitrator's conclusions of
law are erroneous."5 6 This agreement allowed a court to vacate an arbitration
award in a way which was negotiated by the parties, but it was inconsistent with
sections 10 and 11 of the FAA. 57 The question for the Supreme Court was wheth-
er sections 10 and I I of the FAA are the exclusive grounds for vacatur of arbitra-
49. Id. at 437.
50. See, e.g, McCarthy v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 463 F.3d 87, 91 (1st Cir. 2006); Hoeft v.
MVL Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 2003); Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 370 (3d Cir.
2003); Three S Delaware Inc. v. DataQuick Info. Sys., Inc., 492 F.3d 520, 527 (4th Cir. 2007); Prestige
Ford v. Ford Dealer Computer Servs., Inc., 324 F.3d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 2003); Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Jaros, 70 F.3d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 1995); Halim v. Great Gatsby's Auction
Gallery, Inc., 516 F.3d 557, 563 (7th Cir. 2008); Manion v. Nagin, 392 F.3d 294, 298 (8th Cir. 2004);
Collins v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 505 F.3d 874, 879 (9th Cir. 2007); Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v.
Echostar Satellite L.L.C., 430 F.3d 1269, 1275 (10th Cir. 2005); Scott v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 141
F.3d 1007, 1017 (11 th Cir. 1998).
51. See Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, Happily Never After: When Final and Binding Arbitra-
tion Has No Fairy Tale Ending, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 167, 205 (2008). See also I DOMKE, supra
note 35, § 38:9.
52. See I DOMKE, supra note 35, § 38:9.
53. Christopher R. Drahozal, Codifying Manifest Disregard, 8 NEV. L.J. 234, 235 (2007) (citing
Cytcy Corp. v. Deka Prods. Ltd. P'ship, 439 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 2006)).
54. Arthur D. Felsenfeld & Antonette Ruocco, 'Manifest Disregard' after 'Hall Street': The Early
Returns, 9/18/2008 N.Y.L.J. 24, (col. 1) (2008).
55. Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (2008).
56. Id. at 1400-01.
57. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10, 11 (2006)
No. 21
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tion agreements within its jurisdiction when the parties have contracted other-
wise.
5p
The Court held that sections 10 and 11 "provide the FAA's exclusive grounds
for expedited vacatur and modification." 59 The Court considered Hall Street's
argument that under Wilko courts had accepted expanded judicial review authority
in the form of the manifest disregard doctrine.6° The Court noted the vagueness of
the Wilko dicta and reasoned that "[m]aybe the term 'manifest disregard' was
meant to name a new ground for review, but maybe it merely referred to the [sec-
tion 10] grounds collectively, rather than adding to them." 61 The Court also rea-
soned that "manifest disregard" might have been meant as a shorthand way of
62referring to section 10(a)(3) or section 10(a)(4). Whatever the meaning of the
Wilko dicta, the Court in Hall Street found "no reason to accord it the significance
that Hall Street urges. 63
D. Life After Hall Street
The Hall Street decision cast serious doubt on whether "manifest disregard"
of the law is still a viable option for vacating an arbitration award. 64 That deci-
sion, which neither completely affirmed nor extinguished the doctrine, creates
problems considering that every federal circuit had previously adopted some form
65
of the doctrine. Since Hall Street, several courts have come to different conclu-
sions regarding whether the doctrine still exists or has become extinct.
In Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Bacon,66 Citigroup moved to vacate an
arbitration award regarding unauthorized withdrawals from an Individual Retire-
ment Account. 67 The district court granted the motion to vacate after finding that
the award was made in manifest disregard of the law. 68 The U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit considered the question of whether manifest disregard
remained a valid, independent ground for vacatur after the Hall Street decision. 69
58. Hall St. Assocs., 128 S. Ct. at 1400.
59. Id. at 1403.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1404.
62. Id.
63. Id. The Court also found that, regarding Wilko's language, "[a]lthough it is true that the Court's
discussion includes some language arguably favoring Hall Street's position, arguable is as far as it
goes." Id. at 1403.
64. See Hans Smit, The Calm and the Storm: Arbitration Experts Speak Out On Hall Street Asso-
ciates, 26 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LMG. 104 (May 2008).
65. See McCarthy v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 463 F.3d 87, 91 (1st Cir. 2006); Hoeft v. MVL
Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 2003); Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 370 (3d Cir. 2003);
Three S Delaware, Inc. v. DataQuick Info. Sys., Inc., 492 F.3d 520, 527 (4th Cir. 2007); Prestige Ford
v. Ford Dealer Computer Servs., Inc., 324 F.3d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 2003); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc. v. Jaros, 70 F.3d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 1995); Halim v. Great Gatsby's Auction Gallery,
Inc., 516 F.3d 557, 563 (7th Cir. 2008); Manion v. Nagin, 392 F.3d 294, 298 (8th Cir. 2004); Collins v.
D.R. Horton, Inc., 505 F.3d 874, 879 (9th Cir. 2007); Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. Echostar Satel-
lite L.L.C., 430 F.3d 1269, 1275 (10th Cir. 2005); Scott v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 141 F.3d 1007, 1017
( lIth Cir. 1998).
66. 562 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2009).
67. Id. at 350.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 355.
[Vol. 2009
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The Court held that manifest disregard must be abandoned as an independent,
non-statutory ground for vacatur and that arbitration awards under the FAA must
only be vacated under the grounds in section 10.70
In Prime Therapeutics L.L.C. v. Omnicare, Inc., the plaintiff moved to va-
cate an arbitration award relating to a Pharmacy Network Agreement.72 In Prime,
the plaintiff argued that the arbitrator's award was in manifest disregard of the
law. 73 The plaintiff argued that the Hall Street decision "did not overrule judicial-
ly created grounds for vacating arbitration awards.' 74 The court disagreed, stating
that under Hall Street, parties are not allowed to expand on sections 10 and 11 of
the FAA by contract. 75 Next, the court found that "[it would be somewhat incon-
sistent to say that the parties cannot contractually alter the FAA's exclusive
grounds for vacating or modifying an arbitration award, but then allow the courts
to alter the exclusive grounds by creating extra-statutory bases for vacating or
modifying an award. 76 Thus, the court dismissed the plaintiffs manifest disre-
gard claim, finding that it was not one of the exclusive grounds for vacatur under
the FAA.77
Finally, in Ramos-Santiago v. United Parcel Service,78 the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit addressed manifest disregard briefly in dictum.79 The
court said, "We acknowledge the Supreme Court's recent holding in Hall Street..
. that manifest disregard of the law is not a valid ground for vacating or modifying
an arbitral award in cases brought under the Federal Arbitration Act."
80
While some courts have concluded that the manifest disregard doctrine is no
longer valid, others have concluded that it still survives. In Stolt-Nielson S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds International Corp.,81 the U.S. Court of Appeals for. the Second
Circuit recognized that its precedent viewing manifest disregard as an additional
ground to the FAA was not consistent with Hall Street's holding and that the
grounds for vacatur and modification in the FAA are exclusive. 82 However, the
court mentioned that Hall Street questioned whether manifest disregard was meant
to refer to section 10 grounds instead of adding to them. 83 Specifically, the court
decided that, consistent with Hall Street, it could vacate arbitration awards where
"the arbitrator knew of the relevant [legal] principle, appreciated that this principle
controlled the outcome of the disputed issue, and nonetheless willfully flouted the
70. Id. at 358.
71. 555 F. Supp. 2d 993 (D. Minn. 2008).
72. Id. at 995-96.
73. Id. at 996.
74. Id. at 997. The court acknowledged that "the Eighth Circuit has recognized two 'extremely
narrow' extra-statutory grounds for vacating an arbitration award," including manifest disregard of the
law. Id.
75. Id. at 999.
76. id.
77. Id.
78. 524 F.3d 120 (1st Cir. 2008).
79. Id. at 124.
80. Id. at 124 n.3 (emphasis added). The court found Hall Street not applicable in this case though,
since the claim was not brought under the FAA. Id. at 124.
81. 548 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2008).
82. Id. at 94.
83. Id. at 94-95.
No. 2]
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governing law by refusing to apply it."8 4 The court concluded by stating that this
view of the manifest disregard doctrine was encompassed by section 10(a)(4) of
the FAA, which allows for vacatur where the arbitrator has exceeded her pow-
ers.
85
Similarly, in Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Associates,86 the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered the impact of Hall Street on its manif-
est disregard precedent. 87 The court began by recognizing that, in the Ninth Cir-
cuit, manifest disregard is shorthand for section 1 0(a)(4) of the FAA.88 The court
employed the same reasoning as the Second Circuit and stated that, for an award
to be in manifest disregard of the law, the record must be clear that the arbitrator
recognized the particular law and chose to ignore it.89 Thus, the court concluded,
"manifest disregard of the law remains a valid ground for vacatur because it is a
part of [section] 10(a)(4). ' 90
Finally, in Joseph Stevens & Co. v. Cikanek,91 the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois explained the Hall Street decision's effect on the Se-
venth Circuit's manifest disregard precedent. 92 The court stated that in the Se-
venth Circuit, a court may vacate an award for manifest disregard only "by direct-
ing the parties to violate the law or by failing to adhere to the legal principles spe-
cified by the contract." 93 The court noted that Hall Street questioned whether
manifest disregard was either an interpretation of the FAA or if it was a judicially
created additional ground.94  Regardless, the court concluded that the specific
manifest disregard standard of the Seventh Circuit was cabined entirely within
section 10(a)(4) of the FAA.95
Before Hall Street, the Sixth Circuit applied a fairly standard test for manifest
disregard claims. 96 The Hall Street decision cast doubt on courts' analysis of
manifest disregard claims, and as a result is now forcing courts, such as the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals, to make their own determinations as to the breadth of
the Supreme Court's holding.
84. Id. at 95 (quoting Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co., 304 F.3d 200, 217 (2d Cir. 2002)).
The court added that its "review for manifest disregard is 'severely limited,' 'highly deferential,' and
confined to 'those exceedingly rare instances' of 'egregious impropriety on the part of the arbitrators."'
Id. (quoting Duferco Int'l Steel Trading v. T. Klavenesss Shipping A/S, 333 F.3d 383, 389 (2d Cir.
2003)).
85. Id.
86. 553 F.3d 1277 (9th Cir. 2009).
87. Id. at 1289-90.
88. Id. at 1290.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 2008 WL 2705445 (N.D. I11. Jul. 9, 2008).
92. Id. at *4.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. The court found that its narrow definition of manifest disregard would qualify as an instance
where the arbitrator had "exceeded their powers." Id.
96. See Coffee Beanery Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C., 300 F. App'x 415, 418 (6th Cir. 2008). "Thus, an
arbitrator acts with manifest disregard if (1) the applicable legal principle is clearly defined and not








In Coffee Beanery, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit first ana-
lyzed past Sixth Circuit precedent that addressed vacating arbitration awards. 97
The court found that, under the FAA, there is a presumption that arbitration
awards will be confirmed, and that the standard for review is extremely limited. 98
Additionally, the court stated that its ability to vacate an arbitration award was
limited to the nearly exclusive grounds of section 10 of the FAA.99
However, the court said that it could vacate an award that was in manifest dis-
regard of the law.' ° ° The court noted that, in the Sixth Circuit, a court could not
vacate an award for a simple error in interpretation or application of the law.
101
Instead, for the court to vacate an award, the arbitrator's decision must "fly in the
face" of the applicable legal principle.102 Therefore, the court found that manifest
disregard of the law exists if: "(1) the applicable legal principle is clearly defined
and not subject to reasonable debate; and (2) the arbitrators refused to heed that
legal principle."1
0 3
Next, the court addressed the Hall Street decision. The court acknowledged
that the decision in Hall Street significantly reduced the grounds for federal courts
to vacate arbitration awards, but it stated that the decision had not eliminated the
manifest disregard doctrine entirely. 104 The court reasoned that Hall Street did not
determine the precise meaning of Wilko but only held that Wilko did not allow
parties to contractually expand judicial review of arbitration agreements. 10 5 The
court found it significant that, since Wilko, every circuit had adopted a form of the
manifest disregard doctrine.1°6 Therefore, because manifest disregard was such a
"universally recognized principle," and since Hall Street had not explicitly re-
jected the doctrine, the court decided to continue to apply the doctrine. 10 7
The court then addressed whether the arbitrator had manifestly disregarded
the law. 10 8 While WW asserted that Shaw's conviction for grand larceny should
have been disclosed, the arbitrator found that, under the Franchise Act, Shaw's
conviction was not a felony conviction that Coffee Beanery was required to dis-
close.1t 9 Conversely, the court, in examining the common law of Maryland, found




100. Id. The court stated that, in Wilko, the Supreme Court had implicitly recognized manifest disre-
gard of the law as a basis for judicial review of arbitration awards. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. (quoting Merrill Lynch v. Jaros, 70 F.3d 418,421 (6th Cir. 1995)).
103. Id. (quoting Jaros, 70 F.3d at 421).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 418-19. In coming to this conclusion, the court discussed Hall Street's language concern-
ing the possible interpretations of the Wilko dicta. Id.
106. Id.
107. id.
108. Id. The court declined to address WW's other arguments, including that: (1) the Arbitrator over-
reached her authority, (2) the franchise agreement was unconscionable, and (3) the Arbitrator had a
conflict of interest. Id.
109. Id. at 420.
No. 21
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tion involving "misappropriation of property.""l 0 The court reasoned that, by
definition, "misappropriation of property" included convictions for grand larce-
ny."' The court found that the law could not be more clear and that the arbitrator
knew that this law was applicable to the situation." 12
However, the court determined that the arbitrator's finding--that the non-
disclosure of Shaw's felony conviction did not cause damage to WW-did not
constitute "a refusal to heed a clearly defined legal principle."" 3 The court be-
lieved that this finding concerned whether WW was entitled to damages under the
Franchise Act but not whether WW was entitled to a rescission of the franchise
agreement. 114 Therefore, since the arbitrator expressly declined to follow an es-
tablished legal principle regarding the grand larceny conviction, the court found
that WW should be allowed to seek a rescission and other remedies in a court of
law. 1' 5 Finally, the court contemplated the purpose of the Franchise Act and in-
terpreted that it was to allow parties to make informed decisions when deciding
with whom they would enter into franchise agreements. 116 Since WW had been
deprived of the notice required by the statute, the court found that WW should not
be bound by the arbitration provisions which were part of the agreement WW was
fraudulently induced into signing in the first place. 1
7
V. COMMENT
A. The Sixth Circuit's Decision Fails To Address Pertinent Issues
Due to the relatively short amount of time since the Supreme Court's decision
in Hall Street, there are few circuit courts of appeals decisions dealing directly
with whether the manifest disregard doctrine survived that decision. In Coffee
Beanery, the Sixth Circuit had the opportunity to clear up some of the issues left
out of the Hall Street decision. For example, does the manifest disregard doctrine
survive at all after Hall Street? Even though the Sixth Circuit held that it does, the
court failed to address relevant issues such as whether manifest disregard is only a
judicially created doctrine or whether the doctrine is an interpretation of section
10(a)(4) of the FAA. Instead, the court seemed satisfied with a conclusory analy-
sis and appeared more inclined to keep such a "universally recognized principle"
than to attempt a thorough analysis of the Hall Street decision."
18
A more thorough analysis of Hall Street could have done more to bring unity
to the inconsistent state of the law currently surrounding the manifest disregard
doctrine. Such an analysis might have led the Sixth Circuit to find that not only is
manifest disregard no longer a viable judicially created ground for vacatur, it also
110. Id.; See MD. CODE ANN., Bus. REG. § 14-216(c)(8)(i) (West 2004).
11I. Coffee Beanery Ltd., 300 F. App'x at 420. "Larceny in Maryland is a common-law crime, con-
sisting of the taking and carrying away of the personal property of another with intent to deprive the
owner of the property permanently." Id. (quoting Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 803 (1969)).
112. Id. at 420-21.





118. Id. at 419.
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should not be interpreted as part of section 10(a)(4), as other courts which have
kept manifest disregard have done." 
9
At first glance, Hall Street seems to imply that the manifest disregard doctrine
is no longer a viable ground for vacatur at all since the Supreme Court ultimately
holds that the FAA's grounds for vacatur are exclusive and that manifest disregard
of the law is not one of them. 12  However, the Court never expressly holds that
manifest disregard is no longer good law. 121 In the case, Hall Street argued that
the FAA grounds for vacatur were not exclusive because Wilko courts had used
manifest disregard as an additional, judicially created doctrine for vacatur. 122 The
Court rejected that argument, thus rejecting manifest disregard as a judicially
created additional ground. 123 However, the Court left open the possibility that
manifest disregard survived as an interpretation of section 10 of the FAA. 1"
Unlike some other courts which continue to apply manifest disregard after
Hall Street, it is noteworthy that the Coffee Beanery court did not conclude that
the doctrine is contained within section 10 of the FAA.' 21 In fact, the Sixth Cir-
cuit found that while Hall Street did reduce the ability for vacatur outside of sec-
tion 10, it did not foreclose manifest disregard completely. 126 The court found that
under Hall Street, Wilko did not allow parties to expand judicial review of arbitra-
tion awards by contract. 127 The court's brief discussion of Hall Street implies that,
in the Sixth Circuit, manifest disregard of the law is still a viable "judicially in-
voked" ground for vacatur in addition to section 10 grounds. This conclusion is
supported by the significance that the court gives to the Hall Street language stat-
ing "[m]aybe the term 'manifest disregard' [in Wilko] was meant to name a new
ground for review. ' 28 As previously mentioned, Hall Street held that the FAA's
grounds for vacating an arbitration award are exclusive.' 29 If the manifest disre-
gard dicta in Wilko was meant to name a new ground for vacatur, then this ground
would be in addition to those explicitly enumerated in the FAA. 30
Thus, it seems that Hall Street precludes courts from using manifest disregard
as a ground for vacatur unless it is interpreted as part of section 10.131 In Coffee
Beanery, the Sixth Circuit made no attempt to synthesize the manifest disregard
119. See Stolt-Nielson S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2008); Comedy Club,
Inc. v. Improv West Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277 (9th Cir. 2008); Joseph Stevens & Co. v. Cikanek, 2008
WL 2705445 (N.D. Ill., Jul. 9, 2008).
120. Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1403 (2008).
121. Id. at 1404.
122. Id. at 1403.
123. Id. at 1404.
124. Id. The Court said that maybe manifest disregard "merely referred to the §10 grounds collective-
ly, rather than adding to them." Id. "Or as some courts have thought, 'manifest disregard' may have
been shorthand for §10(a)(3) or §10(a)(4), the subsections authorizing vacatur when the arbitrators
were 'guilty of misconduct' or 'exceeded their powers."' Id.
125. Coffee Beanery Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C., 300 F. App'x 415,419 (6th Cir. 2008).
126. Id. at 418-19.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 419 (quoting Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1404 (2008)). This language was merely dicta and
conjecture by the Court, not actually a holding of the case. Id. (citing Hall St, 128 S. Ct. at 1404).
129. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1403.
130. 1 DOMKE, supra note 35, § 39:7.
131. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 94 (2d Cir. 2008) (Hall Street is
"undeniably inconsistent with some dicta by this Court treating the 'manifest disregard' standard as a
ground for vacatur entirely separate from those enumerated in the FAA.").
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doctrine with the FAA.132 The holding of the case, therefore, seems to contradict
the holding of Hall Street.133 The court's odd analysis, though, supports the gen-
eral feeling among some commentators that there has not been any consistency in
court decisions concerning the applicability, or the viability, of the manifest disre-
gard doctrine after Hall Street. 1
3 4
B. Manifest Disregard Does Not Fit Within Section 1O(a)(4)
Due to the present inconsistency among circuits, an essential question which
the Sixth Circuit failed to address is whether manifest disregard should survive an
interpretation of section 10 of the FAA. While section 10 contains four grounds
for vacatur, 35 many courts find manifest disregard to be an interpretation of sec-
tion 10(a)(4), which allows vacatur where an arbitrator has exceeded her powers
or imperfectly executed them. 136 However, this line of reasoning is inconsistent
with Hall Street and the traditional interpretations of section 1 0(a)(4).
First, an arbitrator's powers are determined by the parties to the contract con-
taining the arbitration agreement. 137 Traditionally, section 10(a)(4) applies when
the arbitrator decides issues or grants relief that was not considered by the arbitra-
tion agreement. 138 Under section 10(a)(4), the reviewing court must determine
whether the arbitrator had the authority under the contract to decide an issue, not
whether the issue was decided correctly. 139 If the court finds that the arbitrator has
decided issues within her scope of authority under the contract, then the court
must defer to the arbitrator's interpretation of the law even if the court is con-
vinced that the arbitrator committed a serious error. 40
In many circumstances, parties give arbitrators the authority to decide their
claims based on a certain body of law. 14 In that situation, the parties have agreed
that an arbitrator, and not a court, will interpret the body of law they have cho-
sen. 142 Thus, arbitrators would not "exceed their powers" by interpreting the law,
regardless of whether the interpretation was "correct," because interpreting the
132. Coffee Beanery, Ltd., 300 F. App'x at 419.
133. Compare Hall St., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1403 (holding that the grounds for vacatur in the FAA are
exclusive), with Coffee Beanery, 2008 WL 4899478, *4 (leaving open the possibility that the manifest
disregard doctrine survives in addition to the FAA grounds).
134. See Felsenfeld & Ruocco, supra note 54.
135. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006).
136. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animal Feeds Int'l. Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 95 (2d Cir. 2008); Comedy
Club Inc. v. Improv West Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th Cir. 2008); Joseph Stevens & Co. v.
Cikanek, 2008 WL 2705445 at *4 (N.D. Ill., Jul. 9, 2008).
137. 1 DOMKE, supra note 35, § 39:6.
138. Id.
139. Id. ("In determining whether an arbitrator has exceeded the authority granted under the contract,
a court cannot base the decision on whether the court would have awarded the same relief, or whether
or not the arbitrator correctly interpreted the contract. The court must instead focus on whether the
arbitrators had authority to reach a certain issue, not whether that issue was correctly decided.").
140. Id. For example, in Coffee Beanery the arbitrator had the authority to interpret Maryland law
under the arbitration agreement. Under section 10(a)(4) the arbitrator could not have "exceeded her
powers" by merely interpreting the common law crime of larceny incorrectly under Maryland law.
This would be true even though, as the court found, the arbitrator's interpretation of the law was ob-
viously wrong.
141. ld. § 8:1.
142. Albert G. Besser, The Arbitrator Blew It! Now What?, 29 VT. B.J. 39, 45 (2003).
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law is exactly what the parties contracted for.'43 In fact, the Wilko dictum itself
states explicitly that an arbitrator's interpretation of the law is not subject to judi-
cial review for error.' 44 Therefore, it seems that only a certain articulation of the
manifest disregard doctrine would fit with section 10(a)(4). This situation would
arise where the arbitrator knows exactly what the relevant law is, knows how it
should be interpreted, knows that the law determines the outcome of the case, and
consciously decides not to apply that law. 145 Nevertheless, in Coffee Beanery, the
standard applied by the court found manifest disregard where "(1) the applicable
legal principle is clearly defined and not subject to reasonable debate; and (2) the
arbitrators refused to heed that legal principle."'
' 46
While the two standards may appear similar, their differences are illustrated
by the outcome of Coffee Beanery. In Coffee Beanery, the dispute arose when the
arbitrator decided that a felony conviction for grand larceny was not a felony in-
volving a "misappropriation of property" under the Franchise Act, and thus did
not require disclosure to WW. 147 The court found that the arbitrator's interpreta-
tion of the law "fl[ies] in the face of clearly established legal precedent."' 148 It
reached this determination because larceny in Maryland involves "the taking and
carrying away of the personal property of another with intent to deprive the owner
of the property permanently."' 49 The arbitrator did not ignore the law, nor did she
determine the case based on the wrong law. The court simply found that the arbi-
trator interpreted Maryland law differently than it would have. Alternatively, the
arbitrator may have manifestly disregarded the law if she knew that grand larceny
involved a "misappropriation of property" but ignored the law anyway.
The opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Comedy
Club, Inc. v. Improv West Associates150 further illustrates the inconsistent applica-
tion of the manifest disregard doctrine. In Comedy Club, the court found manifest
143. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 37-38 (1987) ("Be-
cause the parties have contracted to have disputes settled by an arbitrator chosen by them rather than
by a judge, it is the arbitrator's view of the facts and of the meaning of the contract that they have
agreed to accept. Courts thus do not sit to hear claims of factual or legal error by an arbitrator as an
appellate court does in reviewing decisions of lower courts.").
144. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953), overruled on other grounds by Rodriquez de
Quijas v. Shearson/American Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) ("[T]he interpretations of the law by the
arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for
error in interpretation. The United States Arbitration Act contains no provision for judicial determina-
tion of legal issues such as is found in the English law.").
145. A good articulation of this can be found in a Sixth Circuit case decided before Coffee Beanery,
where the court said:
When "properly utilized and applied, the 'manifest disregard' of the law standard does not lead to
vacatur based on a judicial determination that the arbitrator made an error of the law, of any de-
gree. Instead, vacatur results under when the arbitrator makes clear in some manner that she ap-
preciates and understands the law relevant to the matter before her, but nevertheless proceeds to
ignore that law.
Crye-Leike, Inc. v. Thomas, 196 F. Supp. 2d 680, 684 (W.D. Tenn. 2002) (quoting Stephen L. Hay-
ford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 Ga. L.
Rev. 731, 818 (1996)); see also Thomas E.L. Dewey & Kara Siegel, Room For Error: 'Hall Street'
and the Shrinking Scope of Judicial Review ofArbitral Awards, 5/15/2008 N.Y.L.J. 24 (col. 5) (2008).
146. Coffee Beanery Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C., 300 F. App'x 415 (6th Cir. 2008).
147. Id. at 418.
148. Id. at 420.
149. Id., citing Fletcher v. State, 189 A.2d 641 (1963).
150. 553 F.3d 1277, 1283 (9th Cir. 2009).
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disregard of the law when an arbitrator enforced a covenant not to compete. 15 1
The court found that manifest disregard existed as an interpretation of the text of
section 10(a)(4), and that manifest disregard existed where the arbitrator clearly
recognized the applicable law and then ignored it.152 However, the court did not
adhere to the literal meaning of its own interpretation. Instead, the court con-
ducted a long review of Ninth Circuit case law and held that the arbitrator's inter-
pretation of the law was not consistent with Ninth Circuit precedent.153 Again, the
court took issue with the fact that the arbitrator's interpretations of law were in-
correct, not that the arbitrator had appreciated the relevant law and then ignored it.
A simple example may be useful in discerning the difference between a prop-
er standard of manifest disregard as an interpretation of section 10(a)(4), and an
improper one. Assume that two parties to a contract for the sale of goods agree to
submit all disputes to an arbitrator who will settle claims in accordance with the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). Furthermore, assume that the outcome of the
dispute hinges on whether one of the parties is a "merchant" under the code. The
arbitrator would "exceed her powers" under section 10(a)(4) by either refusing to
apply the UCC altogether, or by deciding the case on a different body of law. As
long as she does decide the claim based on her interpretations of the UCC, how-
ever, those interpretations should not be reviewable by a court no, matter how
ridiculous they appear.
Perhaps courts are reluctant to abolish the manifest disregard doctrine pre-
cisely because of cases such as Coffee Beanery and Comedy Club where the arbi-
trator's interpretation of the law was irreconcilable with the court's interpretation
of it.154 However, by agreeing to arbitrate in the first place, parties are essentially
taking their chances with an arbitrator's interpretations of law over a courts' in
order to utilize the advantages of arbitration such as time and cost. 55 By inter-
preting manifest disregard as part of section 10(a)(4), but still vacating awards for
errors in interpretation of the law, courts are practically abrogating the parties'
arbitration agreement. This interpretation arguably makes arbitration "merely a
prelude to a more cumbersome and time-consuming judicial review process.' 156
This interpretation also seems inconsistent with the nature of arbitration, which is
that parties may contract for an arbitration proceeding in any way they choose,
with the only caveat being that, under Hall Street, they cannot contract for judicial
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1290.
153. Id. at 1293. "The grounds given by the arbitrator... are fundamentally incorrect." Id.
154. Id. at 1292 ("Keeping in mind these settled principles of California law ... which principles
were expressly before the arbitrator, we proceed to evaluate whether the arbitrator's decision was in
manifest disregard of the law.").
155. Perini Corp. v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 610 A.2d 364, 385 (N.J. 1992) (Wilentz, C.J.,
concurring) ("People generally choose arbitration for many reasons: speed, economy, and finality.
They trust the process and they trust the arbitrators. Whatever the combination of reasons, the bottom
line is the same: they choose arbitration because they do not want litigation. They simply do not want
the courts to have anything to do with it. When parties choose arbitration, the role that the judiciary
should aim at is to have no roll at all.").
156. Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1405 (2008) (quoting Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-
Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 998 (9th Cir. 2009)).
[Vol. 2009
14
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2009, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 12
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2009/iss2/12
Consistent with Inconsistency
review outside of sections 10 and 11 of the FAA. 157 Thus, courts are essentially
adding on to section 10 what the Hall Street decision says the parties cannot con-
tract for outside of section 10.158
VI. CONCLUSION
It is likely that courts and commentators will continue to debate the viability
of the manifest disregard doctrine until some uniformity among the circuits oc-
curs, the Supreme Court resolves the issue, or Congress amends the FAA. 159 The
Sixth Circuit's ruling in Coffee Beanery fails to analyze the pervasive issues of
manifest disregard adequately in light of Hall Street. The court neither forecloses
manifest disregard as an extra-statutory ground for vacatur, nor, like other courts,
views the doctrine as an interpretation of section 10(a)(4) of the FAA. For the
courts that take the latter position, in some instances, this interpretation allows
them to continue to review arbitration awards for legal errors despite the tradition-
al view that section I0(a)(4) does not allow judicial review of legal errors. This
position also leads to more costly and time-consuming review, which is what arbi-
tration is meant to prevent in the first place.' 6° As of now then, all that is clear is
that the issue is still unresolved.
JOHN C. STEFFENS
157. Id. ("Instead of fighting the text, it makes more sense to see the three provisions, §§9-11, as
substantiating a national policy favoring arbitration with just the limited review needed to maintain
arbitration's essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway.").
158. Prime Therapeutics, L.L.C. v. Omnicare, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 2d 993, 999 (D. Minn. 2008) ("It
would be somewhat inconsistent to say that the parties cannot contractually alter the FAA's exclusive
grounds for vacating or modifying an arbitration award, but then allow the courts to alter the exclusive
grounds by creating extra-statutory bases for vacating or modifying an award.").
159. Smit, supra, note 64.
160. Perini, 610 A.2d 383-84 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring).
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